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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
fund. Unless this is done, the court will certainly subtract the estate
taxes before computing any statutory shares.' 7
It would seem that the Roth case represents the better view There
appears to be no good reason why a residuary clause similar to that in
Roth must be invalidated simply because the widow elects to take her
statutory share. Giving effect to the testator's intention as expressed in
such a clause is neither unfair to the other beneficiaries nor contrary to
public policy.
WILLIAM A. HANCOCK
SALES - IMPLIED WARRANTY - RESTAURANT FOOD
Webster v Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc.,
198 N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 1964)
A warranty action as it exists today is a curious hybrid of tort and
contract law ' At its inception, liability in such cases was based on tort
and the action was trespass on the case.2 Warranty subsequently came
to be regarded as a term of the contract of sale; the remedy for breach
was a cause of action sounding in contract.3 The first warranty cases involv-
ing sales required express representations as to the character or quality of the
goods, but during the nineteenth century a trend began which gave rise
to the present day implied warranties.4 Implied warranties became crys-
tallized in the Uniform Sales Act' and are presently found in the Uniform
Commercial Code.6
In Webster v Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc.,7 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts was faced with the task of interpreting provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code in a case involving sale of food by a
restaurant. There, plaintiff, a resident of New England, went into de-
fendant's restaurant for lunch and ordered a bowl of fish chowder. After
taking several swallows of chowder, plaintiff discovered that something
had lodged in her throat. Two days later a fish bone was located and
removed, but only after it had caused injury to plaintiff's throat.' The
plaintiff brought suit and was awarded the verdict from the auditor and
trial court, whereupon the defendant appealed to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. There, the court reversed the trial court and
held that there was no breach of implied warranty of fitness for mer-
chantability
17. The phrase "or otherwise" is critical. This indicates that the decedent recognized the
possibility of his wife's renunciation of the will and that in such event he desired item VIII
to be effective. It would also be advisable to include an express provision stating how the
taxes should be paid in the event of the widow s renunciation of the will. A future court
may not give the phrase "or otherwise" the same broad meaning as did Judge Wasserman
in the Roth case.
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In order to properly analyze this decision, it is necessary to examine
the background of the questions involved. At common law three con-
siderations existed when implied warranty actions were brought against
restaurants: (1) whether food was a part of the service given to a
lodger; (2) whether substances found in food were natural to it;
and (3) whether tort defenses applied to warranty actions. As to the
first consideration, early courts held that since the lodger paid for food
and lodging in one lump sum, he was only buying a service and no im-
plied warranty existed if the food was unfit or adulterated.9 Today, how-
ever, a majority of jurisdictions hold that sale of food is subject to an im-
plied warranty of fitness."° The Uniform Commercial Code specifically
1. Court decisions in states which have adopted the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
should be of particular interest to the other twenty-seven jurisdictions. This is especially true
as to implied warranties, since many of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE provisions are new.
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 95, at 651 (3d ed. 1964); see Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2
HAEV. L. REV. 1 (1888).
3. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 651. See generally Wilson, Products Liability, 43
CALIF. L REv. 614 (1955).
4. "Early in the nineteenth century the slow growth of a business practice by which reputable
sellers stood behind their goods, and a changing social viewpoint toward the seller's respon-
sibility, led to the development of "implied" warranties of quality, which were attached by the
law to certain types of sales, and which in effect made the seller an insurer of his goods."
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 653 (citations omitted). See generally Prosser, The Im-
plied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L REV. 117 (1943).
5. A simple explanation of these provisions is found in PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 653.
[The Uniform Sales Act reduces the implied warranties of quality] to two: a war-
ranty that the goods are fit for the particular purpose of the buyer, when that pur-
pose is made known to the seller, and the latter knows that the buyer is relying
upon his skill or judgment to select and furnish suitable goods; and a warranty that
the goods are of merchantable quality, when they are bought from one who deals in
goods of that description.
6. The warranty provisions are found in §§ 2-312, 318 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
[hereinafter cited as UCC]. Citations are to the 1962 official text published by the American
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The fol-
lowing sections are pertinent to this discussion: (1) Section 2-314(1) provides that "unless
excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale", (2) Section 2-314(2) (c) states that "goods to be mer-
chantable must be at least such as (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used"; (3) Section 2-316(3) (c) provides that "notwithstanding subsection (2) (c) an
implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealings or course of per-
formance or usage of trade."
7. 198 N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 1964).
8. Id. at 309-10.
9. See, e.g., Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 Ad. 533 (1914); Nisky v. Childs Co., 103
NJ.L 464, 135 Ad. 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927). Cf. Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis.
2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960). Some courts have called this the Connecticut-New Jersey
rule. It appears, however, that today neither state may be following this theory. See PROSSER,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 655 n.18.
10. The majority rule is called the Massachusetts-New York rule. E.g., Friend v. Childs
Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918); Sartn v. Blackwell, 200 Miss. 579,
28 So. 2d 222 (1946); Betehaa v. Cape Cod Corp., supra note 9. See also PROSSER, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 655.
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provides that food and drink served on the premises shall be subject to an
unplied warranty of merchantability. 1
The second consideration as to foreign substances found in food con-
cerns the test of what constitutes reasonable fitness. 2 The case law
has developed two tests. Under the "naturalness" test, it is held that
any substance natural to the food in which it is found cannot be a legal
defect and does not give rise to a breach of warranty of reasonable fit-
ness.'3 In order to overcome the harsh results of the naturalness test,
some courts devised the "reasonable expectation" test.'4 Under this rule
the courts look at what is reasonably expected to be found in the food
and not what might be natural to the ingredients." This test usually
involves a jury question, for the courts refuse to hold as a matter of
law that a patron must reasonably expect a bone or other natural sub-
stance in his food just because of its presence in the unprepared food.
However, a few jurisdictions, including Ohio, have reversed jury verdicts
for plaintiffs on the ground that the trial court should have found as a
matter of law that the substance was natural to the product.'6 Both the
naturalness test and the reasonable expectation test are still valid, and
appear to be applicable to the ordinary purposes test under the Uniform
Commercial Code.'
The third consideration under the common law is whether tort de-
fenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk apply to implied
warranty cases. Some authorities state the better view to be that such
defenses are not available in the contract-warranty area.'8 On the other
hand, some courts permit these defenses if the plaintiff discovers the de-
fect but proceeds to use the product, resulting in injury."9 The Uniform
11. See UCC§ 2-314.
12. See UNIFORM SALES Acr § 15(2). In § 2-314(2) (c) the UCC uses "fit for ordinary
purposes" instead of "reasonably fit."
13. See, e.g., Silva v. F. W Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P.2d 76 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1938); Goodwin v. Country Club, 323 Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944) See gen-
erally Note, Implied Warranty and the Sale of Restaurant Food, 63 W VA. L. REV. 326
(1961).
14. See Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960)
15. See, e.g., Wood v. Waldorf System, Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951); Betehia v. Cape
Cod Corp., supra note 14.
16. See Berns, Sales, Survey of Ohio Law - 1960, 12 W RES. L REv. 550, 552 (1961)
17 While the UNIFORM SALES AcT does not define merchantability, the case law decided
under the act defines it in the same way as the UCC. From this one could argue that with the
same language being used, these tests could be used under the UCC. See, e.g., Burr v. Sherwin
Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954); McCabe v. Liggett Drug Co., 330 Mass.
177, 112 N.E.2d 254 (1953); DeGraff v. Myers Foods, Inc., 8 Bucks Co. L Rep. 364, 19 Pa.
D. & C. 2d 19 (C.P. 1958) See generally 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY,
§ 19.03[2], at 504-06 (1961).
18. See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 17, § 16.01[31, at 367-68; MORRIS,
TORTS 283 (1953)
19. See PROSSER, op. ct. supra note 2, at 356-57
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Commercial Code deals with the problem by means of special provisions
which may bar recovery to a buyer who uses a product after he knows of
a defect.20
In the Webster case, the court viewed the problem as one of applying
the Uniform Commercial Code in light of the above common law tests. In
this respect, the court looked to three important facts which it held to be of
particular significance: (1) the plaintiff was born and rajsed in New
England;2 (2) fish chowder recipes do not mention the removal of
bones;' and (3) a person sitting down in New England to eat fish
chowder embarks on an adventure which may entail the removal of
some fish bones.23 On the basis of these three points, the court held that
bones in chowders should be anticipated in light of the traditional re-
cipes, and consequently do not impair its fitness for merchantability.24
The court in Webster cited two cases25 as authority, neither of which
were soup cases2" nor decided under the Uniform Commercial Code. Both
cases were cited in support of the view that restaurants are -not liable for
natural substances left in the food after preparation. However, it is
interesting to note that although the same result was reached in both
of these cases, each seemed to use a different test; the reasonable expec-
tation test was applied in one case, while the other was decided on the
naturalness test.2 8 It would appear that the Webster case adopted the
reasonable expectation approach, although the court makes no specific
mention of the existence of either test.29
Since the Webster case was decided in a state which has adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code, it is significant to note the consequences
which flow from the adoption of the reasonable expectation test. A care-
ful examination of this test shows that it allows the defense of assump-
tion of risk to be brought into warranty cases in a disguised form. For
example, in Webster the case was decided on whether the plaintiff should
20. UCC § 2-316, comment 8. The code makes allowance for buyers who discover the de-
fect but use the goods anyway by providing that the defective product may not be the proximate
cause of the injury.
21. Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 1964).
22. Id. at 311-12.
23. Id. at 312.
24. IWtd.
25. Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ( fishbone in fish);
Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.B.2d 167 (1960) (oyster shell in oysters);
26. For a case involving soup which would allow plaintiff to recover, see Wood v. Wal-
dorf System, Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951). Wood was decided under the reasonable
expectation test.
27. Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960)
28. Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 'F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955). The court's de-
asion mentions the naturalness test and hints at the reasonable expectation test, although the
reasoning seems to discuss the naturalness test as the true test.
29. Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 198 N1.2d 309, 312 (Mass. 1964)
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have reasonably expected to find the undesirable item because of her
imputed knowledge of the recipes used in making the soup. Thus, if the
court holds as a matter of law or the jury finds as a matter of fact that the
plaintiff should have reasonably expected the presence of the foreign
substance, but nevertheless proceeded to eat the food causing injury, the
plaintiff would be precluded from recovering on an implied warranty
But in Webster it is uncertain as to whether the court meant to extend
the negligence defense of assumption of risk to a warranty case. On the
one hand, it could be argued that in adopting the reasonable expectation
test the court was actually motivated by the fact that the plaintiff had
assumed the risk. This would bring Massachusetts into the class of juris-
dictions which have extended negligence defenses to warranty cases. On
the other hand, it might be argued that the court merely wanted to
apply the reasonable expectation test, but without extending the defense
of assumption of risk to a warranty action.
The court could have perhaps avoided this ambiguity by applying
section 2-316(3) (c) of the Uniform Commercial Code. This section
provides that an implied warranty can be excluded or modified by usage
of trade."0 Section 1-205 (2) defines usage of trade as any practice or
method in a place which justifies an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question. Section 1-205 further pro-
vides that "an applicable usage of trade in the place where any part of
performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as
to that part of the performance."'" The court in Webster points out that
it is a tradition in New England to serve fish chowder which is not
completely boned and that the average New Englander should expect this."
On this basis, it could have been argued that the customer accepted this
usage as part of the contract for the purchase of food, and by applying
these sections of the code the court could have concluded that no implied
warranty existed concerning the presence or absence of bones in fish
chowder. This approach would have enabled the court to reach the same
conclusion and in addition render a decision which is more acceptable
under the code.
A burden has been placed on courts in states which have adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code to give rulings which conform with the code
and which clearly explain how it is to be applied. The Webster decision
avoided application of the code and used instead the common law "rea-
sonable expectation" test. The problem raised in using this test is that
30. See Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales
Warranties, 8 U.C.LA.L REV. 281, 305, 318 (1961).
31. UCC § 1-205(5).
32. One can only wonder if the Webster court would have ruled in the same way if the plain-
tiff would have been a resident of another state and unaware of the recipes for fish chowder.
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it may be a disguised form of assumption of risk, opening up a further
question of the propriety of extending negligence defenses to warranty
actions. This problem could have been avoided in the Webster case by
application of the code provisions excusing warranty of fitness if a cer-
tain usage of trade so demands." Thus, the court could have ruled that
in New England the usage of trade is that a patron cannot expect a chef
to find every possible bone in fish chowder, and that bones in soup do
not impair its fitness for consumption.
JAMES D. KENDIS
33. The usage of trade would be between the patrons and the restaurant. Another approach,
however, might be that the custom is determined by the restaurant.

